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Abstract
A model of economic growth is presented in which firm produc-
tivity is encoded in manager’s knowledge. Knowledge is subject to
random shocks and is transmitted to some workers, who then become
managers. Some managers start their own firms. In the competition
for labor, the most productive firms are favored, so average productiv-
ity grows over time. The model predicts that the firm-size distribution
rapidly converges to a Pareto distribution with exponent close to one,
as seen by researchers looking at firm-size data. The model also pre-
dicts the existence of “gazelles”: firms that grow rapidly from birth,
gradually decelerating as they become large. Finally, the model pre-
dicts a scale effect that is strong in small economies but very weak in
large economies.
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1 Introduction
Economic growth is the outcome of incremental improvements in produc-
tivity. Large numbers of people strive against the odds to improve their
economic standing by thinking of possible ways to increase output. By the
sheer weight of numbers, some surely succeed. Assume there is a mechanism
of knowledge transmission between people that favors the most productive
ideas. Given such a mechanism even random ideas will be filtered so that
output ratchets upward, one positive shock at a time.
This paper presents a model of growth in which productivity is encoded in
manager’s knowledge within firms. Managers randomly come up with new
ideas, and laborers learn those ideas, as in the classic master-apprentice rela-
tionship. Once knowledge is transmitted from managers to laborers, laborers
become managers, who then come up with new ideas. A selection mechanism
is proposed by which the rate of learning is increasing in the productivity
associated with the manager’s ideas. The combination of random idea gen-
eration and selective learning leads to economic growth.
The details of the model are as follows. There are two factors of production,
labor and management. The basic unit of production, henceforth called a
‘unit’ consists of a single manager and several laborers. Firms are collections
of units (see Figure 1). Each unit produces homogeneous output that is
immediately consumed by the manager and laborers. The productivity of a
unit is encoded in the knowledge of the manager, who directs the activities of
the laborers. There are diminishing returns to labor and the labor market is
competitive, hence laborers earn a market wage. Managers earn the output
of their units net of wages paid to labor. Managers choose the number of
laborers that maximizes this net income. As a result, the number of laborers
in a unit is an increasing function of the productivity of that unit. The
model abstracts from the existence of firm owners separate from managers,
and hence ignores income-smoothing arrangements that probably exist in the
real world, such as managers earning a salary and owners making a profit.1
Let us now consider for a moment an economy where firms contain just one
production unit. Then we can equate firms with units and just talk about the
dynamics of units. The log-productivity of a unit can be pictured as a rung
on a quality ladder (Aghion & Howitt, 2001). During each interval of time,
1So far, this model is reminiscent of Lucas (1978).
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a manager gets a new independent idea, which causes the log-productivity of
the unit to either ascend to the next higher rung with some probability p, or
to descend to the next lower rung with probability 1− p.2 At each point in
time a manager must rationally decide whether to continue managing, or to
stop managing and join the labor market. The optimal rule is to exit when
income is sufficiently below the market wage that the value of waiting for a
future productivity boost is less than zero.
The mechanism of learning is as follows. In the course of working, laborers
passively gain access to the knowledge of their managers. As a result, some
laborers become managers, who hire new laborers and create new units.
The rate of production of managers is an increasing but concave function of
the number of laborers in the unit. The concavity arises because laborers
(students) are sharing the attention of a single manager (teacher). Since the
number of laborers in a unit is increasing in the unit’s productivity, the rate
of production of new managers is also increasing in the unit’s productivity.
Hence there is selection for the most productive ideas.
In the case where production is Cobb Douglas and where the concavity of
the learning function takes the form of a log function, the above model is an-
alytically tractable. The economy gravitates to a stable path where the rate
of production of new units equals the rate of exit of unproductive units, and
the distribution of log-productivity across units takes the form of a traveling
wave, representing a growing economy. Surprisingly, a calibration to U.S.
data suggests that a wage growth-rate of 2% per annum is consistent with
zero-mean productivity shocks. Given the growing market wage, a manager
needs to be exceptionally lucky to maintain a given level of profit for very
long.3
In the above discussion, units are treated as though they are small inde-
pendent businesses and all managers are entrepreneurs, coming up with new
ideas on their own. But within firms, managers do not act independently.
Let us define a firm to be a collection of units that experience perfectly cor-
related productivity shocks. Let us assume that most new managers stay
in their “parent” firms and hire new laborers, which leads to firm growth.
2According to Harberger (1998), declines in productivity are common. For example,
they can occur because of changing factor prices.
3The Red Queen said to Alice “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do,
to keep in the same place.” (Carroll, 1871).
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In addition, let’s assume that a small (fixed) percentage of new managers
become independent entrepreneurs and launch spinoff firms with initial pro-
ductivity equal to that of their parents. The reason that we need spinoffs
is that without them the economy would eventually be dominated by a sin-
gle highly-productive monopoly. An implication of this model is that fast-
growing firms produce more spinoffs than slow-growing firms, consistent with
the data (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005, Franco & Filson, 2006).
The proposed model of firm growth is reminiscent of Edith Penrose (1959).
She wrote that firm growth is constrained by the need to transmit internal
knowledge by training new managers. Such encoded knowledge can only be
absorbed in house, and cannot be acquired by simply hiring managers from
the outside. A modern version of this story is that firms must accumulate
firm-specific “organization capital” in order to grow (Prescott & Visscher,
1980).
Turning to spinoffs, the assumption that a fixed percentage of new managers
leave their firms to start new firms is very simplistic. It is not the intension
of the present study to graft an endogenous model of spinoffs, such as can be
found for example in Franco & Filson, (2006) or Chatterjee & Rossi-Hansberg
(2012), onto the model of growth. Rather, the intention is to recognize the
need to include spinoffs in order to prevent concentration, and to include
them in as simple a manner as possible. One way to think about spinoffs is
that they occur, by definition, when the behavior of a manager is uncorrelated
with the behavior of the other managers in the firm. Klepper & Thompson
(2010) find that disagreement between managers is an important trigger of
spinoffs. In essence, we assume that most people are comfortable in taking
directions from others, but a small percentage are stubbornly independent.
In the new version of the model containing firms, the entry of new firms bal-
ances the exit of unproductive firms and the distribution of log-productivity
across firms is the same as that across units in the previous model. The
growth rate is unchanged. Other predictions are as follows. First, newborn
firms are small relative to incumbent firms. Second, growth rates generally
decline with age. In particular, some firms are “gazelles”: they are very
productive at birth and grow rapidly, then slow down as they become large.
And third, the firm-size distribution rapidly approaches a Pareto distribution
with exponent just above one. These predictions are broadly consistent with
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the data.4
The final prediction of the model is that there is a strong scale effect in
small economies but a very weak scale effect in large economies. The model
predicts that for a typical-sized modern economy, an increase in population
by a factor of ten leads to an increase in the growth rate of only 0.2%. The
observed scale effect seems to be somewhat higher than this, but there is so
much noise that an absence of scale effects is also consistent with the data
(Jones, 1995; Dinopoulos & Thompson, 1999). Hence the prediction of a
small scale effect in modern economies is consistent with observation given
the uncertainty of the estimates.
The concave scale effect deserves some explanation. Let us assume that the
mean of stochastic productivity shocks is zero. If there is only one firm, then
stochastic productivity shocks do not lead to long-term growth. Monopoly
implies stagnation. If there are several firms, there is competition for labor
and selection for the most productive firm. Since the distribution of log-
productivity shocks is normal, large positive draws are unlikely. But the
more firms there are, the more likely that one of them will experience a
large positive shock. Hence there is a strong scale effect. This argument is
a variation on the idea that the larger the population, the more likely that
a genius will be born.5 However, when the population of firms is large, the
finite rate of diffusion of knowledge puts a brake on the scale effect. Laggard
managers, who have not yet been trained in the leading firms, spend time
inventing things that have already been invented. Hence the scale effect
becomes weak once an economy becomes large.
Related Literature The main theme of the present model is that growth
is the outcome of selection operating on random ideas. Nelson & Winter
(1982) developed an early and influential contribution to growth theory along
these lines. The direct ancestor of the present model is described in Staley
(2011) and Luttmer (2012a).6 In that model there is individual random
4Axtell (2001) observed a Pareto distribution with exponent close to one for U.S. firms.
See Luttmer (2011) for a discussion of the growth path of large firms.
5William Petty, writing in London in the seventeenth century, may have been the first
economist to point to the strong scale effect when he said: “...it is more likely that one
ingenious curious man may rather be found amongst 4 millions than among 400 persons.”
(as quoted by Dimoploulos & Thompson, 1999).
6That model is in turn based on models of idea flows developed by Alvarez et al. (2008)
and Lucas (2009).
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innovation and imitation across individuals, leading to a traveling wave of
productivity. Two similar models, also yielding traveling wave solutions, are
Ko¨nig et al. (2015) and Luttmer (2015). In the model of Ko¨nig et al. firms
either innovate or imitate other firms, depending on which option yields the
higher expected profit. Luttmer (2015) describes a model with random pro-
ductivity shocks and knowledge transfer inside firms. None of these models
predict a Pareto firm size distribution with exponent close to one.7
Luttmer (2011) describes a model of firm growth that gives rise to a Zipf dis-
tribution. The relevant mechanism is blueprint replication that operates at
two speeds, an initial high speed and a subsequent low speed. The combina-
tion of an initial high speed and random transition to low speed ensures that
the size distribution rapidly approaches the Zipf distribution. The present
model works in a similar fashion except that there is a continuum of speeds,
each corresponding to a different productivity, and blueprint replication is
replaced with internal knowledge transfer between managers and workers.
None of the above models, other than Staley (2011), address the scale effect.
The scale effect has a role to play in models of long run growth that in-
corporate preindustrial Malthusian dynamics, the industrial revolution, and
modern growth. Jones (2001) assumes an accelerating rate of idea creation as
the population grows in early times, based on data in Kremer (1993). Galor
(2011) utilizes a scale effect to explain the takeoff from preindustrial stagna-
tion to modern growth. Romer (1990), Grossman & Helpman (1991), Aghion
& Howitt (1992) describe endogenous growth models that have strong scale
effects. Jones (1995) and Dimopoulos & Thompson (1999) show that there
is little evidence for scale effects in modern economies. Jones’ critique of the
scale-effect prediction of early endogenous growth models prompted the de-
velopment of second-generation models that avoided the strong scale effect,
either by introducing an expanding number of sectors or by introducing a
so-called “weak scale effect” that linked productivity growth to population
growth (see Jones, 1999 for a summary). The present model leaves open the
possibility of a strong scale effect in small economies such as existed prior to
industrialization, but avoids the strong scale effect in large economies with-
out the need for an expanding number of sectors, and without having to link
7Several other recent models incorporate diffusion of knowledge but not stochastic
generation of new ideas. In those models the growth rate depends on the shape of the
existing productivity distribution. Prominent examples are Alvarez et al. (2012), Lucas
(2009), Lucas & Moll (2014), and Perla & Tonetti (2014).
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productivity growth to population growth.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The
model with independent units is first described. Then, a nonlinear partial
differential equation is derived for the distribution of productivity and an
analytic solution is found. Then, firms are introduced and it is shown that
the distribution of firm size is Pareto with exponent close to one. In Section 3
the model is calibrated to U.S. data and several predictions are tested against
the empirical data. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Independent Units
Production: A unit of production (henceforth a ‘unit’) consists of one
manager and several laborers, as in Lucas (1978). The output yi of unit i is
yi = Ai l
α
i ,
where Ai is the productivity of the unit, which is encoded in the ideas of the
manager, li is the labor employed by the unit, and α is the span of control
parameter. The integer i takes on values from 1 to M , where M is the
number of managers.
Given a market wage w, each manager maximizes income net of wages pii:
pii = max
li
(yi − wli) . (1)
The supply of labor is L, hence
∑M
i li = L. The equilibrium solution for the
labor market is
li = Bi
(α
w
) 1
1−α
, w = α
(∑M
i Bi
L
)1−α
, (2)
where we have introduced Bi = A
1
1−α
i . We will be refering to Bi as the
productivity. Finally, we have
L+M = N,
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where N is the total number of people in the economy, which is assumed
constant.
Productivity Shocks: The productivity of each unit is subject to inde-
pendent random shocks as follows
dxi = µdt+ σ dzi, (3)
where xi = lnBi and dzi ∼ N(0, dt). The above equation is used in analysis,
but in simulation a quality ladder is implemented using binomial shocks ∆xi
over a small time step ∆t:
∆xi =
{
σ
√
∆t, with probability p,
−σ√∆t, with probability 1− p,
where
p =
1
2
(
1 +
µ
σ
√
∆t
)
.
This implementation is consistent with (3) for very small time steps and
prevents unrealistically large shocks from occurring in the simulation.
Exit: There is a fixed cost w per unit time associated with running a unit.
If the manager is the owner of the unit, w is the opportunity cost of being
a manager. If the owner is separate from the manger then w is the wage
paid to the manager. The owner must decide when to exit from the business.
Assuming risk neutral behavior, the value function is (dropping the index i)8
V (pi, t) = sup
τ
Et
[∫ t+τ
t
e−ra[pi(a)− w(a)] da
]
,
where τ is the optimal stopping time and r is the interest rate. We will
assume that w grows at the rate gw (to be determined later). From Equation
(1) we have the following useful expression for the profit (dropping time
dependence)
pi −w = w (eh − 1) ,
where
h = x− 1
1− α lnw + ln
(
α
α
1−α (1− α)
)
,
8This section follows Luttmer (2012b), Section 3.3. The technique is described in detail
in Dixit & Pindyck (1994).
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and from (3) we have
dh =
(
µ − 1
1− αgw
)
dt+ σ dz.
Defining V (pi, t) = w(t)F (h), the Bellman equation is
(r − gw)F =
(
µ − 1
1− αgw
)
dF
dh
+
σ2
2
d2F
dh2
+ eh − 1,
which has an exact solution. The stopping point he is such that F (he) = 0
and dF/dh|he = 0, which joins smoothly with the region below he where the
value function must be zero. The solution implies the following lower bound
on profit, which we can call pie(t):
pie(t) = w(t)
ξ
1 + ξ
(
1 +
gw
1−α
− µ − σ2
2
r − gw
)
, (4)
where
ξ =
− gw
1−α
+ µ
σ2
+
√( gw
1−α
− µ
σ2
)2
+
2(r − gw)
σ2
.
When the profit of a unit falls below the quantity on the RHS of (4), the
unit exits and the manager enters the labor market.
Learning: So far, the elements of the model described above can be found
in other similar models. The unique element of the present model is the
learning mechanism. Given li laborers in unit i, the rate of production of
new managers is assumed to be η ln li, where η is a constant. New managers
start new units with the same productivity as their former units. If there
are ni units with productivity Ai, the rate of production of units having that
productivity is
dni
dt
= ν ni ln li, li > 1. (5)
The equation captures a crowding effect. Even though each laborer is equally
adept at learning, the overall rate of production of new managers is less
than linear in the number of laborers. As we will see, the choice of the log
function enables an analytic solution to be found for the growth rate and for
the distribution of productivity. The condition li > 1 also turns out to be be
satisfied because exit occurs when there is more than one employee.
9
2.2 Solution - Independent Units
A simulation of the above system of equations shows that the economy grav-
itates to a balanced growth path in which the distribution of units across
log-productivity takes the form of a traveling wave. The shape of the travel-
ing wave is fixed and moves to the right at a constant speed, representing a
growing economy. Define ρ(x, t) to be the probability density of units with
respect to x at time t. That is, ρ(x, t) dx is the proportion of units having
log-productivity between x and x+ dx at time t. From (5) and (2), we can
express the learning rule in the following form:
∂ρ
∂t
= ν(x− x0)ρ,
where
x0 =
1
1− α ln
(w
α
)
.
The Kolmogorov forward equation for (3) is9
∂ρ
∂t
= −µ∂ρ
∂x
+
σ2
2
∂2ρ
∂x2
Combining the Kolmogorov forward equation with the learning equation we
have the following time-evolution equation for the density function:
∂ρ
∂t
= −µ∂ρ
∂x
+
σ2
2
∂2ρ
∂x2
+ ν(x− x0)ρ. (6)
This nonlinear partial differential equation exhibits traveling wave solutions,
similar to those seen in the study of reaction-diffusion systems in physics.10
We can use a trick to find the speed of the traveling wave (the growth rate of
the economy) in terms of the parameters of the model.11 Define new variables
9For a discussion of the Kolmogorov forward equation (also called the Fokker-Planck
equation), see Cox & Miller (1995).
10Reaction diffusion equations are reviewed in Grindrod (1996). A good reference on
kinematic wave equations such as Equation (6) is Whitham (1974).
11This trick is from Tsimring et al. (1996), who use a similar differential equation in
their model of RNA virus evolution.
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as follows
x˜ =
(
2ν
σ2
)1
3
(x− µt), (7)
t˜ =
(
σ2
2
ν2
) 1
3
t. (8)
Equation (6) in terms of the new variables is
∂ρ
∂t˜
=
∂2ρ
∂x˜2
+ (x˜− x˜0)ρ. (9)
In this version of the differential equation there are no parameters. Let’s say
the speed of the wave in terms of these new variables is s. We can translate
s back into the original variables as follows
gx = µ+ σ
4
3
(ν
4
) 1
3
s. (10)
And from (2) the growth rate of the market wage is gw = (1− α)gx.
We still need to get s, and it would be nice to know the shape of the traveling
wave. We need to find a solution to Equation (9) of the form ρ(x˜, t˜) =
u(x˜ − st˜). Substituting this form into (9) and shifting by x˜0 we have the
following ordinary differential equation
0 = s
du
dz
+
d2u
dz2
+ zu, (11)
where z = x˜ − x˜0. The solution is obtained by substituting u(z) = eazf(z).
The choice of a = −s/2 leads to
0 =
d2f
dy2
− yf,
where y = s2/4− z. This is the Airy equation, and the solution is called the
Airy function Ai(y).
12 So finally, we have
u(z) = Ce−s
z
2Ai
(
s2
4
− z
)
, (12)
12See Abramowitz & Stegun, 1964, p. 446. There is another solution Bi that blows up
(see Figure 10.7).
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where C is a normalizing constant. The solution can be re-expressed in term
of the original variables. Figure 2 shows what the shape looks like.
We still don’t know the value of s. All that equation (12) tells us is that
any value of s is admissible and that different values of s give rise to differ-
ent shapes of the log-productivity density function. The analytic solution,
although correct, does not help us to pin down the value of s.
It turns out that the above analytic solution is not the whole story. In the
far-right tail of the productivity distribution, the density of units becomes
very small and the dynamics is dominated by stochastic effects. Of all the
possible speeds, there is only one for which the movements of the body and
tail are consistent. There is no exact analytic technique for dealing with this
kind of dynamics, so we must resort to simulation to obtain s.13 In simulation
studies, s is an increasing but steeply concave function of the number of units
(see Figure 3). This subject will be revisited in the next section.
The above solution is expressed in terms of a density function, but this
doesn’t tell us how many units there are, i.e. how many managers there are.
Simulation studies show that the ratio of managers to laborers converges
towards a constant (less than one) and fluctuates around that constant as
the economy grows. The number of managers is determined by the balance
between the creation of new units via learning and the exit of unproductive
units. It is not possible to derive an analytic expression for the ratio of
managers to laborers, but simulation can be used to obtain this ratio.14
13Fisher, a biophysicist, discusses traveling waves of fitness seen in microbial populations
and offers the amusing analogy of the random snuffing of an exploring dog’s nose: “The
balance between the irregular snuﬄing and the inertial motion of the body determine the
overall speed; yet, as the owner of a large, headstrong dog knows, predicting its speed
is very hard!” (Fisher, 2011). A different Fisher (1937) addressed this issue in his study
of gene propagation. Tsimring et al. (1996) and Brunet & Derrida (1997) study similar
system to ours and derive approximations for the speed.
14One can also numerically integrate Equation (11) between the lower bound on z and
infinity to derive a flow balance condition. The lower bound on z is determined by the
exit condition (4). The flow balance condition implies a relationship between the market
wage and average productivity, which can then be used to numerically derive the ratio of
managers to laborers using equation (2).
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2.3 Firms
The modern economy contains many small firms that are managed by single
individuals, and those firms can be thought of as units. But there are also
firms that are run by groups of managers, and some of those firms are very
large. Let us now consider an extension of the above model in which units
gather together within firms and coordinate their productivity changes. In
particular, let us assume that most new managers stay within their parent’s
firms, and only a small percentage ε break away to start new firms, taking
knowledge (encoded productivity) with them.
The production function of a multi-unit firm is
Yi = Aini
(
Li
ni
)α
= Ain
1−α
i L
α
i ,
where ni is the number of managers and Li is the total number of laborers
in the firm.
In the previous sections, units were characterized by their productivity. Now
firms are characterized by their productivity and by the number of units
sharing that productivity. Let f(x, θ, t) be the density of firms at time t with
respect to log-productivity x and the log of the number of units θ = lnn.
From (5), and the assumption that a proportion 1− ε of new managers stay
in their parent firms, we have15
dθ
dt
= (1− ε)ν(x− x0). (13)
Using equations (3) and (13), the two-dimensional version of the Kolmogorov
forward equation is
∂f
∂t
= −µ∂f
∂x
+
σ2
2
∂2f
∂x2
− (1− ε)ν(x− x0)∂f
∂θ
. (14)
A solution to (14) is
f(x, θ, t) = exp
(
− 1
1− ε θ
)
ρ(x, t), (15)
15Equation (13) implies that the growth rate of firm employment should be proportional
to the log of firm productivity. Bottazzi et al. (2002) provide evidence of this pattern in
Italian manufacturing (see their Figure 10).
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where ρ(x, t) satisfies Equation (6). This solution implies that the distri-
bution of productivity across firms is given by (12), the unit-count density
function is exponential with exponent 1/(1−ε), and that the number of units
in a firm is independent of firm productivity. When the firm-size density is
translated into a density with respect to unit count n, one obtains a Pareto
density function with exponent 1 + 1/(1 − ε). The cumulative distribution
function has exponent 1/(1− ε). This solution is verified in simulation stud-
ies.
The growth rate is unchanged from Equation (10) but now the scale factor
s is a function of the number of firms NF :
gw = (1− α)
{
µ + σ
4
3
(ν
4
) 1
3
}
s(NF ). (16)
The shape of s(NF ) is shown in Figure 3. There is no analytic formula for s
so it must be determined by simulation.
Why does n follow a Pareto distribution with exponent 1/(1− ε)? A simpli-
fied model of firm-growth can be used to answer this question. Consider a
population of firms all having the same growth rate of units gn = (1− ε)g,
where g = ν(x−x0). The firms exist in a kind of growth corridor. It is useful
to imagine that there are discrete corridors. Let’s say there are M managers
in some corridor, and the managers are scattered amongst different firms.
Firms enter with n = 1, and the rate of entry is Mεg. The number of units
in a firm grows as
n = e(1−ε)gt (17)
Now consider a group of firms within the corridor having unit count between
n and n + dn. Differentiating (17) we have dt = dn/ [n(1− ε)g]. So all
the firms with unit count between n and n + dn must have originated from
a pool of new firms of count Mεg dn/ [n(1− ε)g]. Let us also assume that
firms get bumped out of the growth corridor at some hazard rate h due
to stochastic productivity shocks and the increasing market wage. Call the
(non-normalized) density of firms within the corridor f(n). Then the number
of firms having a unit count between n and n+ dn must be
f(n)dn = Mεg
dn
n(1− ε)ge
−ht.
Substituting for t from (17) we have
f(n) = M
ε
1− εn
−(1+ h(1−ε)g).
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The size density function will become stationary when the hazard rate h takes
a value such that the flow of units into the corridor, both from entry and
from firm growth, is offset by the loss of units due to entire firms leaving the
corridor. This occurs when h = g. Hence the steady-state density function
of n is Pareto with exponent 1 + 1/(1 − ε). The cumulative distribution
function is Pareto with exponent 1/(1− ε).
Define the size of a firm as the total employment E = n+nl. Given that the
distribution of n is independent of the distribution of l (via x) it is easy show
that E also follows a Pareto distribution with exponent 1/(1 − ε).16 Figure
4 shows what the distribution looks like. This result confirms what is seen
in the data for U.S. firms (Axtell, 2001). A value of ε around 0.06 seems to
fit the data well.
Since the growth rate of the number of units is a function of productivity,
the independence of size and productivity implies that the growth rate of
firms is cross-sectionally independent of size, which is a form of Gibrat’s law
(Gibrat, 1931). The evidence for Gibrat’s law is mixed, but it is generally
accepted as a first-order approximation, especially for large firms. Santarelli
et al. (2006) provide a comprehensive survey. Note that this result does not
imply that firm growth rates are independent of size for a given firm through
time. In fact, given that x0 rises over time due to the growth of the market
wage, we expect from Equation (13) that the growth rate of a given firm will
show some momentum (positive autocorrelation) but slow down over time.
The autocorrelation prediction seems to be true for established firms but not
for young firms, however the prediction that growth rates decline with age
is well verified by the data (Coad, 2007). A striking example of the latter
is the existence of “gazelles”. Firms that grow rapidly right from birth,
and gradually slow down as they age. They are predicted to be rare since
the density of firms in the right tail of the productivity density function is
small. Classic examples of technology gazelles are Intel and AMD, which were
spawned by Fairchild Semiconductor, itself a gazelle (Klepper & Thompson,
2010).
16In the same vein, the quantity An1−α is Pareto distributed. So if “management” is a
hidden variable, productivity may be Pareto distributed as observed by Ko¨nig et al. (2015)
and Del Gatto (2006).
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Parameter Value Notes
α 0.813 Atkeson & Kehoe (2005), with α transformed accord-
ing to Equation (18).
L 64 million Toossi (2002): American labor force in 1950.
ε 0.06 Pareto exponent as seen by Axtell (2001).
r 0.1 Arbitrary. The interest rate only affects the point of
exit.
ν 0.047 Calibrated so that the firm entry rate is 10% per
annum as seen in U.S. census data. See Luttmer
(2011) and Chatterjee & Rossi-Hansberg (2012).
µ 0 See text.
σ 0.18 Davis et al. (2007), figure 2.5. Values range between
0.1 and 0.2. A value of 0.18 is consistent with a GDP
per capita growth rate of 2% per annum.
Table 1: Parameters used in the simulation studies.
3 Calibration and Tests
The model has been calibrated to data on the U.S. economy in the twentieth
century. The goal was to test Equation (16) for the growth rate. Table 1
lists the resulting parameters. A few notes on the calibration are in order.
To obtain α, the model of Atkeson & Kehoe (2005) was utilized. In their
model, output takes the form
Y = An1−α
(
KβL1−β
)α
where α = 0.85 is the span of control parameter, and βα = 0.199 is the
share of physical capital. Assuming a perfectly elastic supply of capital, or
alternatively a constant savings rate, one can eliminate physical capital to
obtain a production function of the form used in the present model. The
resulting share of labour is
α′ =
(1− β)α
(1− βα) = 0.813. (18)
The labor force L determines the scale factor via NF , as in Figure 3. The
labor force in 1950 was chosen. Given the Pareto form for the firm-size dis-
tribution, the relationship between L and NF is linear. A log-linear approxi-
mation for the scale effect (determined by regression, R2 = 0.92), applicable
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for most countries is
s(NF ) ≈ 0.19 lnNF + 2.4.
Combining this with the relationship between L and NF , also obtained nu-
merically, we have
s(L) ≈ 0.19 lnL+ 1.4. (19)
Th parameter ν was calibrated to the entry rate of firms, which is about
10% per year (Luttmer, 2011, Chatterjee & Rossi-Hansberg, 2012). The
entry rate is proportional to ν, and  is already determined by the observed
exponent of the firm-size distribution. There is no analytic expression for
the entry rate, so simulation was used. The parameter ν was adjusted until
the entry rate was seen to be 10%.
The drift rate of productivity shocks, µ, was set to zero. The was partly to see
if we could calibrate the model to U.S. data assuming a purely “Darwinian”
economy where the only driver of growth is selection. According to Foster
et al. (2005), the retail trade segment of the U.S. economy has been very
Darwinian in recent decades, the most obvious example being the spread of
Wal-Mart units at the expense of local shops. Baily, Hulten & Campbell
(1992) find that about half of productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing in
the 1980s can be attributed to factor reallocation, or selection.
The last parameter to calibrate in Equation (16) was σ. To calibrate σ a link
between productivity growth and size growth was used. From Equation (2),
the volatility of labor changes (per unit) must be the same as the volatility
of B, which is σ. So we can directly use time-series statistics on firm growth
rate volatilities to estimate σ. In Davis et al. (2007), Figure 2.5, values
of σ between 0.1 and 0.2 are shown for the period 1981 to 1996, with the
higher values occurring in the earlier part of the period. Figure 5 shows the
dependence of gw on σ given the other parameters calibrated as above. This
figure shows the interesting tradeoff between growth and stability. If σ = 0.18
(growth volatilities in the early 1980s), the growth rate of the market wage
is about 2% per year, as seen during the twentieth century.
Given the above parameters, we can now check that the condition li > 1 in
Equation (5) is satisfied. The smallest firm in the simulation has 4.4 laborers
and one manager.17
17The simulation allows non-integer numbers of laborers, which implies part-time work-
ers. The simulation also allows for a non-integer number of managers in a firm. The
17
Slope:
gw vs ln (L)*
Intercept* Notes
Model
Prediction
0.0008 0.006 Based on parameters in Ta-
ble 1. See Figure 3.
Cross-Country
Regression
0.0018
(−0.0007, 0.004)
−0.009
(−0.048, 0.029)
R2 = 0.015. 135 countries.
The growth rate of GDP
per capita, 1990 − 2000, is
a proxy for gw (Maddison,
2008). Labor statistics for
1990 are from The World
Bank.
US Historical
Regression,
1820-2000
0.0029
(−10−5, 0.0058)
−0.033
(−0.083, 0.018)
R2 = 0.22. 18 decades.
Population and real GDP
data from Maddison
(2008). Historical labor
participation rates are from
Carter (2003).
* Quantities in brackets are the boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals.
Table 2: Measuring the scale effect.
The firm-size distribution rapidly converges to the Pareto distribution with
exponent 1/(1 − ). The numbers shown in Figure 4 were obtained after
only one hundred years of simulation, starting from firms having equal size.
In order to get such rapid convergence, the gazelles must grow rapidly. In
the simulation, the largest 0.5% of firms had an average growth rate since
birth of 15% per year. This is close to the value of 18% reported by Luttmer
(2011).
Finally, we can test the scale effect. From Equations (16) and (19) we have
gw = 0.0008 lnL+ 0.006
Two tests are shown in Table 2. The first is a cross-country regression and
the second is a times-series regression for the U.S., covering the years 1820
to 2000. In both regressions a positive relationship between the growth rate
and size is detected, but the statistical uncertainty is so large that a null
hypothesis of no relationship cannot be rejected at the 95% level. The pre-
dicted slope of the scale effect from our model fits comfortably within the
interpretation is that as people learn they spend part of their time managing and part of
their time “doing”.
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95% confidence intervals of the empirical slopes. So we can conclude that
the predicted scale effect is too small to be seen.
4 Summary and Conclusions
This paper has presented a simple model of growth based on random inno-
vation and selection. The core assumptions are as follows. First, the produc-
tivity of a unit of production is a function of the ideas held by the manager
of that unit. Second, the span of control of a manager is an increasing func-
tion of the productivity of the unit. Third, managers come up with new new
ideas that affect productivity and they stop being managers if productivity
falls too low. And fourth, laborers passively learn from their managers and
become managers. The resulting economy grows at a steady rate, there are
constant inflows of new firms and outflows of unproductive firms, and the
distribution of productivity across units forms a traveling wave.
A modified version of the model incorporates firms. A firm is a collection
of units that experience perfectly correlated productivity shocks. Most new
managers stay in their firms and hire new laborers, leading to firm growth,
but a small percentage start new firms. In this version of the model the
size distribution of firms becomes Pareto with exponent close to one, as seen
empirically. Some firms grow especially fast, but slow down as they age.
These correspond to “gazelles” and are needed to ensure fast convergence to
the Pareto distribution.
There are two new predictions of the model that require verification. The
first is that the growth rate of an economy is increasing in the volatility of
firm employment growth rates. Second, there is a concave scale effect that is
strong in small closed economies, but very week in large modern economies.
The last prediction of a weak scale effect is consistent with observation, but
the uncertainty is so large that the effect is difficult to confirm.
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Figure 1: Firm Growth and Spinoffs. The letter ‘M’ stands for manager,
and the letter ‘L’ stands for laborer. Laborers are promoted to managers, who start
new production units and hire new laborers. Some managers leave their firm to
start new spinoff firms, initially containing one production unit.
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Figure 2: Productivity Moving Wave. The shape of the density function of
log-productivity maintains its shape and moves to the right at a constant speed.
Simulation result are shown after 100 years using a time step of 1/40 years. The
analytic solution is given by Equation (12). Parameters are listed in Table 1.
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Figure 3: Logarithmic Scale Effect. The log-linear approximation, Equation
(19), captures the dependence of the growth rate on ln(N ) for typical countries.
Simulation results are based on averaging over 100 seeds of the random number
generator.
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Figure 4: Firm Size Density. The simulation starts with 100,000 firms having
equal productivity, a labor force of 64 million, and ε = 0.06. After 100 years, the
log-size density function (circles) is close to exponential with exponent −1/(1 −
0.06) (solid line). Simulation time step is 1/40 years. Parameters are listed in
Table 1.
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Figure 5: Growth rate dependence on σ. There is a tradeoff between growth
and employment volatility. The larger the amount of “noise” in productivity
shocks, the higher the firm growth volatility, but the higher the growth rate of the
economy.
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